

# Measuring Semantic Complexity

Wlodek Zadrozny  
 IBM Research, T. J. Watson Research Center  
 Yorktown Heights, NY 10598 \*  
 wloetz@watson.ibm.com

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## Abstract

We define *semantic complexity* using a new concept of *meaning automata*. We measure the semantic complexity of understanding of prepositional phrases, of an "in depth understanding system", and of a natural language interface to an on-line calendar. We argue that it is possible to measure some semantic complexities of natural language processing systems before building them, and that systems that exhibit relatively complex behavior can be built from semantically simple components.

## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 The problem

We want to account for the difference between the following kinds of dialogs:

*Dialog 1:*

```
-- I want to set up an appointment with Martin on the
    14th of march in the IBM cafeteria.
-- At what time?
-- At 5.
```

*Dialog 2:*

```
-- Why did Sarah lose her divorce case?
-- She cheated on Paul.
```

The first dialog is a task dialog. (And there is rich literature on that topic e.g. [1], [17], [25]). The second kind of dialog has been reported by Dyer [5], whose program, BORIS, was capable of "in depth understanding of narratives" (but there were a whole series of such reports in the 70s and early 80s by Schank and his students, cf. [7], [12]).

Of course one can argue (e.g. [18]) that none of the programs truly understands any English. But even if they fake understanding, the question remains in what sense is the domain of marital relations more complex than the domain of appointment scheduling (if it really is); what is behind these intuitions, and in what sense they are proved wrong by the existence of a program like BORIS.

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(Notice that the syntax of the first dialog is more complex than the syntax of the second one, but, intuitively, discussing divorce cases is more complicated than scheduling a meeting).

More practically, we would like to be able to measure the process of understanding natural language, and in particular, to estimate the difficulty of a NLU task before building a system for doing that task.

## 1.2 Practical advantages of a small domain: MINCAL

We have built a natural language interface, MINCAL, to an on-line calendar ([25]). In this system the user can schedule, move and cancel appointments by talking to the computer or typing phrases. To perform an action, the system extracts slot values from the dialogs, e.g. for *Dialog 1*

\*\*\*Slots:

```
[ [ action_name schedule]
  [ event_name      [ an appointment]
  [ event_time      [ [ minute 0] [ hour 17]
                    [ day 14]    [ month 3]
  [ event_place     [ in the ibm cafeteria]
  [ event_partner   [ martin]
```

The system is able to handle a whole range of grammatical constructions, including complex prepositional phrases. The problem of parsing sentences with prepositional phrases is in general complex, but important, because of the role of PPs in determining parameters of situations (in the sense of [4]). The method we use ([22]) is a combination of three elements: (1) limiting structural ambiguities by using a grammar of constructions, where forms, meanings and contexts are integrated in one data structure [24]; (2) using background knowledge during parsing; (3) using discourse context during parsing (including domain and application specific constraints).

The method works because the domain is small. More specifically,

- *Only a small percent of constructions needed*

For instance, for the task of scheduling a room we need 5 out of 30 constructions with "for" mentioned in [14]; and similarly for other prepositions. Note that among all prepositions the class of meanings that can be expressed using "for" is perhaps second least restricted, the least restricted consisting of PPs with "of", which however is not needed for the task.

- *The number of semantic/ontological categories is small*

The second advantage of a limited domain lies in the relatively small number of semantic categories. For example, for the domain of calendars the number of concepts is less than 100; for room scheduling it is about 20. Even for a relatively complex office application, say, WordPerfect Office 4.0, the number of semantic categories is between 200 and 500 (the number depends what counts as a category, and what is merely a feature).

Why this is important? Because not only do we need a set of semantic categories, but also we have to encode background knowledge about them. For instance, given the concept of "range" with its "beginning", "end" and "measure" (e.g. hours) smaller than the value of "end". We should know that two different meetings cannot occupy the same room in overlapping periods of time, we should know the number of days in any month, and that meetings are typically scheduled after the current date, etc.

- *Background knowledge is bounded*

One should ask how many such facts we need? There is evidence ([6], [3], [23]) that the ratio of the number of words to the number of facts necessary to understand sentences with them is about 10:1. In the absence of large bodies of computer accessible common-sense knowledge, this makes the enterprise of building natural language understanding systems for small domains feasible. Thus the advantage of limited domains lies in the fact that background knowledge about them can be organized, hand-coded and tested (cf. [20]).

### 1.3 But what is a "small domain"?

If we compare BORIS ([5], [7]) with MINCAL we notice some clear parallels. First, they have an almost identical vocabulary size of about 350 words. Secondly, they have a similar number of background knowledge facts. Namely, BORIS uses around 50 major knowledge structures such as Scripts, TAUs, MOPs, Settings, Relationships etc.; on average, the size of each such structure would not exceed 10 Prolog clauses (and no more than 4 predicates with 2-3 variables each per clause) if it were implemented in Prolog. If we apply a similar metrics to MINCAL, we get about 200 facts expressing background knowledge about time, events and the calendar, plus about 100 grammatical constructions, many of them dealing with temporal expressions, others with agents, actions etc. Clearly then the two systems are of about the same size. Finally, the main algorithms do not differ much in their complexities (as measured by size and what they do). So the question remains: why is the domain of scheduling meetings "easier" than the domain of discussing divorce experiences? How could we measure the open-ended character of the latter?

## 2 Semantic complexity: from intuitions to meaning automata

We are now ready to introduce the concept of semantic complexity for sets of sentences and natural language understanding tasks, i.e. numbers measuring how complicated they are. To factor in the "degree of understanding", those numbers will be computed relative to some semantic types. Then, for example, if we examine the semantic complexity of two sets of 24 sentences, one consisting of very simple time expressions, and the other of a set of idioms, it turns out – surprisingly – that from a certain perspective they have identical complexities, but from another perspective they do not.

### 2.1 Two sets of 24 sentences and their intuitive complexity

Let us consider the meanings of the following two constructions:

$pp \rightarrow at\ X\ pm/am$   
 $pp \rightarrow at\ noun(bare)$

For each construction we will consider 24 cases. For the first construction these are the numbers 1-12 followed by *am* or *pm*; for the second construction these are expressions such as *at work*, *at lunch*, *at school*, .... Of course the construction *atnoun(bare)* is open ended, but for the sake of comparison, we will choose 24 examples. For simplicity, we will consider the two constructions simply as sets of sentences. We have then two 24-element sets of sentences: The set **T** contains sentences

*The meeting is at X PM\_or\_AM*

where *X* ranges from 1 to 12, and *PM\_or\_AM* is either *am* or *pm*. The set **S** contains 24 sentences of the type

*John is at<sub>X</sub>*

with *at<sub>X</sub>* ranging over (cf. [13]): *at breakfast, at lunch, at dinner, at school, at work, at rest, at ease, at liberty, at peace, at sea, at home, at church, at college, at court, at town, at market, at hand, at meat, at grass, at bat, at play, at uncertainty, at battle, at age.*

Intuitively, accounting for the semantics of the latter is more complicated, because in order to explain the meaning of the expression *John is at work* we have to have as the minimum the concept of working, of the place of work being a different place than the current discourse location, and of a habitual activity. In other words, a whole database of facts must be associated with it. Furthermore, as the bare noun changes, e.g. into *John is at liberty*, this database of facts has to change, too. This is not the case for *at 7 am*, and *8 pm*. Here, we simply map the expression *X pm* into *hour(X + 12)* (ignoring everything else).

## 2.2 Meaning automata and their complexity

In order to prove or disprove the intuitions described in the preceding few paragraphs we need some tools. One of the tools for measuring complexity widely used in theoretical computer science is *Kolmogorov complexity*.

*Kolmogorov complexity* of a string  $x$  is defined as the size of the shortest string  $y$  from which a certain universal Turing machine produces  $x$ . Intuitively,  $y$  measures the amount of information necessary to describe  $x$ , i.e. the information content of  $x$ . (cf. [8] for details and a very good survey of Kolmogorov complexity and related concepts). However, for our purposes in this paper, any of the related definitions of complexity will work. For example, it could be defined as the size of the smallest Turing machine that generates  $x$  (from an empty string); or we could use the Minimum Description Length of Rissanen ([8] and [9]), or the size of a grammar (as in [11]), or the number of states of an automaton.

We could define semantic complexity of a set of sentences  $S$  as its Kolmogorov complexity, i.e. as the size (measured by the number of states) of the simplest machine  $M$ , such that for any sentence  $s$  in  $S$  its semantics is given by  $M(s)$ . However this definition is problematic, because it assumes that there is one correct semantics for any sentence, and we believe that this is not so. It is also problematic because the function  $K$  assigning its Kolmogorov complexity to a string is not computable.

Thus, instead, we will define *Q-complexity* of a set of sentences  $S$  as the size of the simplest model scheme  $M = M_S$ , such that any sentence  $s$  in  $S$  its semantics is given by  $M(s)$ , and  $M(s)$  correctly answers all questions about  $s$  contained in  $Q$ .

The words "model scheme" can stand for either "Turing machine", or "Prolog program", or "description", or a related notion. In this paper we think of  $M$  as a Turing machine that computes the semantics of the sentences in  $S$ , and measure its size by the number of states. Of course, there can be more than one measure of the size of the simplest model scheme  $M$ ; and in practice we will deal not with *the* simplest model scheme, but with the simplest we are able to construct. And to take care of the possible non-computability of the function computing *Q-complexity* of a set of sentences, we can put some restriction on the Turing machine, e.g. requiring it to be finite state or a stack automaton.

We can now define the concept of *meaning automaton* (M-automaton) as follows. Let  $Q$  be a set of questions. Formally, we treat each question as a (partial) function from sentences to a set of answers  $A$ :

$$q : S \rightarrow A$$

Intuitively, each question examines a sentence for a piece of relevant information. Under this

assumption the semantics of a sentence (i.e. a formal string) is not given by its truth conditions or denotation but by a set of answers:

$$\|s\| = \{q(s) : q \in Q\}$$

Now, given a set of sentences  $S$  and a set of questions  $Q$ , their *meaning automaton* is a function

$$M : S \times Q \rightarrow A$$

which satisfies the constraint

$$M(s, q) = q(s)$$

i.e. a function which gives a correct answer to every question. We call it a meaning automaton because for any sentence  $s$

$$\|s\| = \{M(s, q) : q \in Q\}$$

Finally, the *Q-complexity* of the set  $S$  is the size of the smallest such  $M$ .

Note that the idea of a meaning automaton as a question answer map allows us to bypass all subtle semantics questions without doing violence to them. And it has some hope of being a computationally tractable approach.

## 2.3 Measuring semantic complexity

We can measure the semantic complexity of a set of sentences by the size of the smallest model that answers all relevant questions about those sentences (in practice, the simplest we are able to construct). But how are we going to decide what relevant questions can be asked about the content of the set, e.g. about: *Mary is at work*, and *John is at liberty*. Before we attempt to solve this problem, we can examine the types of questions. A simple classification of questions given by [10] (pp.191-2) is based on the type of answer they expect: (1) those that expect affirmation or rejection — **yes-no** questions; (2) those that expect a reply supplying an item of information — **Wh** questions; and (3) those that expect as the reply one of two or more options presented in the question — **alternative** questions.

## 3 Semantic complexity classes

We now want to examine a few measures of semantic complexity: yes/no-complexity, and "what is"-complexity. We also analyze the complexity of ELIZA [16] as Q-complexity, and argue that defining semantic complexity of NL interfaces as Q-complexity makes sense. In the second subsection we discuss the complexities of MINCAL and BORIS.

### 3.1 yes/no, "what-is" and other complexities

#### 3.1.1 yes-no complexities of T and S are the same

We now can measure the *yes-no*-complexity of both T and S. Let  $M_T$  be the mapping from  $T \times Q_T \rightarrow \{yes, no\}$ , where

$$Q_T = \{q_X : q_X = "Is the meeting at X?"\}$$

and  $M_T(s_Y, q_X) = yes$ , if  $X = Y$ , and *no* otherwise.

( $s_Y = "The meeting is at Y"$ , and we identify the time expressions with numbers for the sake of

simplicity). Clearly, under this mapping all the questions can be correctly answered (remember that question  $q_{13}$  returns *yes* for  $s = \text{"The meeting is at 1 pm"}$ , and *no* otherwise).

$M_S$  is a similar mapping: we choose arbitrary 24 tokens, and map the sentences of  $S$  into them in a 1-1 fashion. As before, for each  $s$  in  $S$ ,  $M_S(s, q)$  is well defined, and each question of the type *Is John at breakfast/.../at age?* can be truthfully answered.

If we measure the semantic complexity by the number of pairs in the  $M_I$  functions, the yes-no complexities of both sets are the same and equal  $24^2$ . If we measure it by the number of states of their respective Turing machines, because the two problems are isomorphic, their yes-no complexity will again be identical. For example, we can build a two state, 4-tape Turing machine. It would scan symbols on two input tapes, and print *no* on the output tape if the two input symbols are not equal. The third input tape would contain five 1's and be used as a counter (the binary string *twxyz* represents the number  $1t + 2w + 4x + 8y + 8z + 1$ ). The machine moves always to the right, scanning the symbols. If it terminates with *accept* and the empty output tape, it means *yes*; if it terminates with *accept* and the *no* on the output tape, it means *no*. This machine can be described as a  $6 \times 5$  table, hence we can assign the complexity of 30 to it.

<i>state</i>	<i>input1</i>	<i>input2</i>	<i>counter</i>	<i>output</i>	<i>next</i>
1	1	1	1	b	1
1	0	0	1	b	1
1	1	0	1	no	1
1	0	1	1	no	1
1	b	b	b	b	acc
(acc)					

We arrive at a surprising conclusion that a set of idiomatic expressions with complicated meanings and a trivial construction about time can have the same semantic complexity. (From the perspective of answering yes/no questions).

### 3.1.2 "what is?"-complexity

Let  $U$  be a finite set of tokens. Consider the following semantic machine  $M_U$ : For any token  $u$  in  $U$ , if the input is "what is  $u$ " the output is a definition of  $u$ . For simplicity, assume that the output is one token, i.e. can be written in one move; let assume also that the input also consists only of one token, namely  $u$ , i.e. the question is implicit. Then, the size of  $M_U$  is the measure of "what is"-complexity of  $U$ . Now, consider  $T$  and  $S$  as sets of tokens. For  $T$  we get the "what is" complexity measure of  $12+4=16$ , as we can ask about every number, the meeting, the word "is", and the tokens "am" and "pm". (We assume "the meeting" to be a single word). For  $S$  we get  $24+2=26$ , as we can ask about every  $X$  in "at  $X$ ", about "is", and about "John".

Thus, the semantic "what is"-complexity of  $S$  is greater than the "what is"-complexity of  $T$ . But, interestingly, the "what is"-complexity of  $T$  is smaller than its yes/no-complexity.

### 3.1.3 Complexity of NL interfaces as Q-complexity

We note that the definition of Q-complexity makes sense not only for declarative sentences but also for commands. Consider, e.g., a NL interface to a calendar. The set  $Q$  consists of questions about parameters of calendar events: *event\_time?*, *event\_name?*, *alarm\_on?*, *event\_topic?*, *event\_participants?*. In general, in the context of a set of commands, we can identify  $Q$  with the set

of queries about the required and optional parameters of actions described by those commands.

Similarly, we can compute the semantic complexity of ELIZA [16] as Q-complexity. Namely, we can identify Q with the set of key-words for which ELIZA has rules for transforming input sentences (including a rule for what to do if an input sentence contains no key-word). Since, ELIZA had not more than 2 key list structures for each of the about 50 keywords, and its control mechanism had 18 states, its Q-complexity was no more than 118.

### 3.1.4 Iterated "what is?"-complexity

What would happen if one would like to play the game of asking "what is" questions with a machine. How complex such a machine would have to be? Again, using the results of [6] and [3] about the roughly 10:1 ratio of the number of words to the number of facts necessary to understand sentences with them, we get that for the set T we need about 20 facts for two rounds of questions. However for S we would need about 250 for two rounds of questions. And these numbers are closer to our intuitive understanding of the semantic complexity of the two sets. (Notice that for iterated "what is"-complexity we assume that an explanation of a term is not one token, but roughly ten tokens).

## 3.2 Semantical simplicity of MINCAL and BORIS

In the previous subsection we have introduced some natural Q-complexity measures, such as yes/no-complexity with  $Q = \{"is this true?"\}$  and  $A = \{yes, no, \perp\}$ , or "what-is"-complexity with  $Q = \{"what is this?"\}$ , and the answers perhaps given by some reference works:  $A = \{a : a \in Britannica \cup Websters\} \cup \{\perp\}$ . We have shown how these two kinds of complexity measures distinguish between the two sets of sentences with "at". We have also argued that semantic complexities of NL interfaces can be measured in a similar fashion. For instance, for a calendar interface we could use  $Q = \{Date? Time?\}$  and  $A = \{[Mo, Day, Yr] : 1 \leq Mo \leq 12, 1 \leq Day \leq 31, 1 \leq Yr \leq 10,000\} \cup \{[Hour : Min] : 0 \leq Hour \leq 24, 0 \leq Min \leq 59\} \cup \{\perp\}$ ; and for ELIZA-type programs:  $Q = \{P_i : P_i \in ELIZA(Patterns)\}$ , and  $A = \{A_i : A_i \in ELIZA(Replies)\}$ .

However we have not yet explained the difference in the apparent semantic complexities of BORIS and MINCAL. We will do it now. First, as we noticed in Section 1.3, their vocabulary sizes and the sizes of their respective knowledge bases are almost identical. Thus, their "what-is"-complexities are roughly the same.

But now our theory can give an explanation of why the sentence *The meeting is at 5* seems simpler than *Sarah cheated on Paul*. Namely, for the last sentence we assume not only the ability to derive and discuss the immediate consequences of that fact such as "broken obligation" or "is Paul aware of it?", but also such related topics as "Sarah's emotional life", "sexually transmitted diseases", "antibiotics", "germs", "flu", and "death of grandmother". In other words, the real complexity of discussing a narrative is at least the complexity of "iterated-what-is" combined with "iterated-why" (and might as well include alternative questions). By the arguments of the preceding section this would require really extensive background knowledge, and the Q-complexity would range between  $10^5$  and  $10^7$ . In contrast, the Q-complexity of MINCAL is less than  $10^4$ .

Now, obviously, one can argue that this analysis is immaterial, because both programs only fake understanding, and that real understanding of the concept of a meeting with a VIP would include e.g. accompanying emotions or its possible consequences for a project. This is a valid point, but the analysis stands, because changing topics, discussing whys and whats is typical for discussing a story, but does not fit into the "conversation for action" paradigm.

## 4 How to build a complex system from semantically simple components?

What is the significance of the numbers we computed in the previous sections? It is an argument showing that it is possible to analyze some cases of semantic complexity of some natural language understanding task before building systems for doing them (e.g. yes/no and what-is complexities). Now, we want to argue that systems that exhibit (or can be attributed) complex behavior can be built from semantically simple components, where semantic simplicity is measured by Q-complexity.

**”What is”-complexity:** A natural language understanding system has to deal with a set of basic objects. For our domains of interest, these are actions (typically, given by VPs), objects of actions (given by NPs), and its parameters (described by PPs). These basic objects combine into possibly quite complex entities to describe properties of situations (e.g. parameters of a meeting).

It can be argued that ”what is”-complexity is a reasonable measure of how complex is the set of those basic objects. Namely, ”what is”-complexity and ”twice-iterated-what-is” -complexity measures the size of the database of background knowledge facts. Intuitively, this is a reasonable measure of their semantic complexity.

**Complexity of grammatical constructions:** In many cases the complexity of a new construction is not much greater than the complexity of the subconstructions they are built from. This is the case of the simple imperative construction  $S(imp) \rightarrow VP\ NP$ . In this case, and in general, there is a trade-off between letting the grammar overgeneralize, e.g. allowing ”schedule a cafeteria”, and increasing the complexity of the grammar, e.g. by increasing the number of noun categories  $np(event)$ ,  $np(place)$  etc.

Similarly, as new constructions introduce more complexities, for example,  $S(imp) \rightarrow VP\ NP\ PP$ , we can increase the number of constructions. In  $S(imp) \rightarrow VP\ NP\ PP$ , PP can modify either the NP or the VP, and the complexity of deciding the meaning of the sentence is a product of all possible combinations of meanings of VPs and NPs. To reduce the number of combinations we split  $S(imp) \rightarrow VP\ NP\ PP$  into  $S(imp) \rightarrow VP\ NP(event)\ PP(at, time)$ ,  $S(imp) \rightarrow VP\ NP(event)\ PP(at, place)$ , and use defaults and filters to exclude less plausible combinations (such as places modifying actions in the calendar context). Thus, roughly, the complexity of the grammar can be estimated by the number of grammatical constructions, defaults and filters.

But what about seemingly more complex constructions such as quantifiers. Wouldn’t they introduce new sorts of complexities? J. van Benthem has shown how to handle them in the spirit of meaning automata; in [15] he used different types of automata to compute semantics of some quantified phrases. Thus, a very simple automaton can compute the semantics of ”all”, as in *Cancel all my meetings today*. A more complex automaton can deal with more complex quantifiers, such as ”most”. The basic idea is simple: to decide whether *most A are B* is true, we can use a push-down store automaton. Its input consist of a word in  $L(\{a, b\})$ , e.g. *abbab*, where *abbab* describes the enumeration of the elements of *A* under which *a* is assigned to an element in  $A - B$  and *b* is assigned to an element in  $A \cap B$ ; the stack is used to store the elements; an element is removed from the stack if the next element is different; the automaton accepts a sequence if at the end only *b*’s are left on the stack. Notice that the meanings of *A* and *B* is ignored here; hence from the point of view of semantic complexity, the semantics of *most A are B* would be very simple (5 states is enough).

**The complexity of discourse:** Despite the simplicity of ELIZA, people were willing to attribute to it a much more complex behavior. The reasons are discussed in [16], and also in [18], where



Winograd and Flores also argue that the basic conversation for action machine has only 9 states. In his classification Bunt [2] lists 18 basic dialog control functions and dialog acts. One can of course argue about the adequacy of either model, but the fact remains that for simple tasks dialog complexity is limited by a small number of basic states.

## 5 Conclusions

What are the contributions of this paper? 1. We have defined semantic complexity by connecting the concept of Kolmogorov complexity with the types of questions that can apply to a sentence (a string). We have introduced the concept of a meaning automaton i.e. an abstract machine for answering questions of interest. 2. We have analyzed semantic complexities of simple examples involving prepositional phrases and of larger NLU programs. 3. We have introduced a new concept of meaning of a string, identifying it with the set of values for a fixed set of questions. 4. We have presented some arguments to the effect that intuitively complex NLU tasks can be done by combining simple semantic automata.

Since this is all new, there are many open questions about the approach. For instance: (1) How useful is the new concept of meaning? What about compositional semantics? Notice that the appeal of compositionality at least partly lies in reducing the complexity of the meaning automaton — at a price of high "what-is"-complexity (i.e. the complex semantic descriptions of words) we get a very simple automaton whose only move is functional application. (See [19] and [21] for a discussion of compositionality).

(2) Can we estimate semantic complexities by statistical means? This is possible for some cases of "what-is"-complexity, e.g. by estimating the number of technical terms in a corpus.

(3) Can we express semantic complexity of a NLU task as a function of the complexity of an automaton partially solving the task and the description (or a corpus) of the whole task. This would be a most welcome result. It would mean that given e.g. a corpus of phrases and a prototype that successfully assigns semantics to 22% of them we could say that a complete system would be, say, two orders of magnitude more complex.

Of course, we are aware of the fact that without some constraints on the type of the corpus/description and the type of automata this kind of problem is undecidable, but the point is to find appropriate constraints. For instance, for "what is"-complexity such a result is trivially holds: the size of the corpus determines the size of the explanation table.

(4) It would be interesting to see under what circumstances the iteration of "what is" questions would result in fixed points, e.g. for sets  $T$  and  $S$ , and what would these fixpoints be (excluding "everything"). Similarly iterations of why questions might eventually result in a fix point. But when?

(5) If we measure the semantic complexity by the number of pairs in the  $M_I$  functions, the yes-no complexities of the two sets  $T$  and  $S$  were the same and equal to  $24^2$ , similarly if we use Turing machines. But notice there are simpler automata for the same task if we permit overgeneralizations, e.g. in our case we only need a machine with two input tapes performing a comparison (i.e. with the complexity of 25, not 30) it behaves almost like the yes-no machine of Section 3.1.1, except that it will also accept pairs  $(q_i, s_i)$ , for  $i > 24$ . The trade-offs between overgeneralization and simplicity can perhaps be investigated along the lines of [11]. For instance, at the price of additional states in the dialog/discourse machine, one could significantly simplify the grammar. We believe that both theoretical and empirical study of the matter is needed.

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